

Message Text

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TO WHITE HOUSE

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EXDIS TOSEC 52

WHITE HOUSE PASS TO PALM SPRINGS FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER

FOLL REPEAT ANKARA 2710 ACTION SECSTATE INFO ATHENS NICOSIA

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QUOTE

S E C R E T ANKARA 2710

EXDIS

FOR THE SECRETARY FROM THE AMBASSADOR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, MASS, GR, TU, CY

SUBJECT: US-TURKISH RELATIONS, GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS

1. AMBASSADOR KUBISCH'S THOUGHTFUL MESSAGE (ATHENS 2494)
REACHES US AT A TIME OF INCREASING EMBASSY ANKARA CONCERN
OVER THE SLOW BUT INEXORABLE DIRFT DOWNWARD THAT NOW
APPEARS TO BE TAKING PLACE IN THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF THE
MEDITERRANEAN. THERE IS DRIFT ON THE CYPRUS PROBLEM
WITH NO ASSURANCE THAT REALLY MEANINGFUL NEGOTIATIONS AMONG
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THE RESPONSIBLE LEADERS ARE IN SIGHT. EVERY DAY THAT THIS
DRIFT CONTINUES AND THERE IS NO PROGRESS TOWARDS A
SOLUTION, THE NECESSARY FLEXIBILITY BY BOTH SIDES BECOME
HARDER TO OBTAIN AND THE EXISTING DE FACTO PARTITION ON THE
ISLAND IS STRENGTHENED.

2. WHILE WE AND THE GOT WERE GRATIFIED BY THE RECENT SFRC MILITARY ASSISTANCE ACTION, THE PROSPECTS FOR TIMELY AFFIRMATIVE CONGRESSIONAL ACTION IN BOTH HOUSES WOULD NOT RPT NOT, VIEWED FROM THIS DISTANCE, APPEAR TO BE ENCOURAGING. ON THIS SUBJECT TOO, THE TURKS' COURSE APPEARS TO BE ONE OF DRIFTING -- PERIODICALLY ASKING FOR STATUS REPORTS ON THE LEGISLATIVE PROSPECTS, CONSTANTLY ALLUDING TO REPRISALS AGAINST OUR INSTALLATIONS HERE, AND DOING PRACTICALLY NOTHING TO HELP THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH PERSUADE CONGRESS TO REVERSE ITSELF. THE TURKS TAKE PRIDE IN THEIR RESTRAINT TO DATE BUT FOCUS ENTIRELY ON US SHORTCOMINGS IN FAILING TO HONOR OUR NATO COMMITMENTS HERE WHILE REFUSING TO ACCEPT ANY TURKISH RESPONSIBILITY, OR PARTIAL RESPONSIBILITY, FOR THE PRESENT STATE OF AFFAIRS. BELIEVING THEIR RESTRAINT HAS BEEN MISINTERPRETED IN THE US AS WEAKNESS, THE TURKS ARE IN THE PROCESS OF GETTING THEMSELVES COMMITTED TO TAKING CONCRETE ANTI-US STEPS HERE PERHAPS IN A MATTER OF DAYS (MAY 1 IS THE DATE GENERALLY SPOKEN OF) IF SIGNIFICANT FURTHER CONGRESSIONAL ACTION IS NOT PROMPTLY FORTHCOMING.

3. ADDED TO THIS, THERE NOW SEEMS TO BE A SENSELESS BUT VERY REAL DRIFT TOWARDS AN ARMED CONFRONTATION IN THE AEGEAN, STIMULATED, WE BELIEVE, BY SOME ELEMENTS, CIVILIAN AND MILITARY, IN THE TURKISH BODY POLITIC WHO FEEL THERE IS ADVANTAGE IN A SHOWDOWN WITH GREECE BEFORE THE TURKISH MILITARY MACHINE (ESPECIALLY IN THE AIR) DETERIORATES FURTHER. TURKISH OVERFLIGHTS IN THRACE AND ELSEWHERE ARE UNHELPFUL AS ARE REPORTED GREEK BUILDUPS OF MILITARY FORCES IN LESBOS, CHIOS AND SAMOS, AS WELL AS ON THE DODECANESE ISLANDS.

4. IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, AND IF THE DRIFT CONTINUES, THERE EXISTS THE TRAGIC POSSIBILITY THAT ANOTHER IN THE LONG SERIES OF WARS BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY COULD BE BLUNDERED INTO. IT WOULD BE A TRAGEDY BECAUSE: (A) WE
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ARE CONVINCED THAT THE VAST MAJORITY OF TURKS DO NOT WANT SUCH A WAR, AND WE ASSUME THE SAME IS TRUE FOR THE GREEKS; AND (B) WE BELIEVE THE MAJOR CURRENT ISSUES BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY -- CYPRUS AND THE AEGEAN -- ARE NOT ONLY NEGOTIABLE, BUT THE PARTIES ARE WITHIN NEGOTIATING DISTANCE OF EACH OTHER. THE PROBLEM IS TO GET BOTH SIDES OUT OF THE PRISON OF HATRED AND MUTUAL DISTRUST WHICH HISTORY AND RECENT EVENTS HAVE BUILT FOR THEM.

5. GETTING THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT TO THINK DISPASSIONATELY ABOUT ITS LONG-TERM INTERESTS WILL NOT BE EASY. AT THIS WRITING IT IS NOT CERTAIN WHETHER THE UNEASY DEMIREL COALITION WILL SQUEAK THROUGH ITS CONFIDENCE VOTE, EVEN WITH THE VERY THINNEST OF MARGINS. IF IT DOES, THE DEMIREL GOVERNMENT WILL

HAVE THE SAME FUNDAMENTAL FLAW OF THE ECEVIT GOVERNMENT, DEPENDENCE ON ERBAKAN AND HIS NATIONAL SALVATION PARTY FOR ITS PARLIAMENTARY MAJORITY. THIS WEAKNESS WILL BE FURTHER COMPOUNDED BY AN ADDITIONAL DEPENDENCE ON THE FARTHEST RIGHT NEO-FASCIST SPLINTER PARTY LED BY TURKES, AND ON OTHER SPLINTER GROUPS AS WELL. THE FRAGILE GLUE THAT MAY HOLD THIS COALITION TOGETHER IS THE NARROW SELF-INTEREST OF A PARTNERSHIP ROOTED IN THE COMMON DESIRE TO AVOID AN ELECTION AT THIS TIME WHEN ECEVIT AND HIS RPP ARE SO POPULAR. THE DEMIREL GOVERNMENT WILL LACK THE ELAN AND INTELLECTUAL APPEAL WHICH ECEVIT'S GOVERNMENT DISPLAYED. MOREOVER, THE DEMIREL GOVERNMENT WILL BE WAGING A DAILY FIGHT FOR ITS LIFE AGAINST ECEVIT, AN EXCEPTIONALLY CAPABLE AND AGGRESSIVE TACTICIAN, AND HIS FOLLOWERS WHO ARE DETERMINED TO BRING IT DOWN AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE. WHILE THERE ARE SOME INDICATIONS THAT THE VIEWS OF DEMIREL AND ECEVIT ON CYPRUS AND OTHER GREEK-TURKISH ISSUES ARE NOT TOO FAR APART, THE AFFIRMATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF THIS WILL BE LIMITED BY THE PRESENCE OF ERBAKAN AND TURKES IN THE GOVERNMENT AND BY ECEVIT'S DRIVE TO REGAIN POWER.

6. AGAINST THIS BACKGROUND OF WEAKNESS AND NARROWLY PARTISAN COMPETITION WITHIN THEIR OWN GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE, THE TURKS VIEW THE KARAMANLIS GOVERNMENT AS THE STRONGEST AND MOST DEMOCRATIC GREEK GOVERNMENT THEY HAVE HAD TO DEAL WITH IN MANY YEARS. THE TURKS KNOW AND RESPECT KARAMANLIS AND BECAUSE OF THIS, AND QUITE SECRET

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APART FROM HIS POSITION OF STRENGTH, THEY WOULD PROBABLY PREFER TO DO BUSINESS WITH HIM THAN WITH ANY OTHER GREEK LEADER THEY KNOW. THE TURKS DO NOT, HOWEVER, ACCEPT THE CONCEPT THAT, AT THIS STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS ON CYPRUS, WHAT WE ARE DEALING WITH IS A STRONG GOVERNMENT IN ATHENS AND A WEAK GOVERNMENT IN ANKARA. THE TURKS BELIEVE THAT IN ASSESSING STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES ONE MUST LOOK AT THE ANKARA-DENKTASH CONGLOMERATE AND THE ATHENS-MAKARIOS CONGLOMERATE. WHILE DENKTASH CANNOT BE DISMISSED AS A TOTAL PUPPET OF THE TURKS (HE HAS THE CAPABILITY OF ACCUSING TURKISH LEADERS OF A LACK OF ZEAL IN DEFENSE OF TURK-CYPRIOI RIGHTS, AS DAMAGING AN ACCUSATION AS CAN BE MADE TODAY AGAINST A MAINLAND POLITICIAN, HE OBVIOUSLY IS FAR MORE UNDER THE CONTROL OF ANKARA THAN MAKARIOS IS UNDER THE CONTROL OF ATHENS. THUS, WHEN THE TURKS LOOK AT THE TWO CONGLOMERATES INVOLVED, THEY SEE AN IMPORTANT MATCHING M

WEAKNESS ACROSS THE CYPRUS NEGOTIATING TABLE OF A PARTICULARLY WORRISOME CHARACTER. IT IS A WEAKNESS WHICH DOES NOT ENCOURAGE MANY TURKS TO THINK THAT AN EARLY AND LASTING NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT IS LIKELY.

7 IN SUM, ALL EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS SUGGEST THAT WITHOUT SOME KIND OF RENEWED OUTSIDE STIMULUS, THE NEGATIVE AND DOWNWARD DRIFT WITH RESPECT TO (A) OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS, (B) CYPRUS, AND (C) THE AGEAN WILL CONTINUE, CARRYING WITH IT DANGEROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR SECURITY IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN. WE SEE NO PRACTICAL ALTERNATIVE TO THE US AGAIN TAKING THE LEADERSHIP IN THE APPLICATION OF THAT CONSTRUCTIVE STIMULUS. WE RECOMMEND THIS COURSE DESPITE, IN FACT BECAUSE OF, THE MANY NEGATIVE AND WORRISOME FACTORS IN THE CURRENT SITUATION.

8. BOTH GREECE AND TURKEY WISH TO MAINTAIN STRONG AND MODERN ARMED FORCES. BOTH MUST LOOK TO THE US AS A MAJOR SUPPLIER OF THE RESOURCES NECESSARY TO THAT END. FOR THE US TO ASSIST A GREECE AND TURKEY AT REAL PEACE WITH EACH OTHER, AND COOPERATING FULLY WITH EACH OTHER IN THEIR NATO RELATIONSHIP, MAKES EMINENT SENSE FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF US SECURITY INTERESTS IN THIS DEEPLY TROUBLED PART OF THE WORLD. FOR THE US TO ARM
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EITHER GREECE, OR TURKEY, FOR ANOTHER WAR BETWEEN THEMSELVES MAKES LITTLE SENSE, FROM ANY VIEWPOINT.

9. WHAT WE SUGGEST IS A TWO-TRACK STRATEGY AIMING AT (A) RESOLVING OUR CONGRESSIONAL PROBLEM, AND (B) GETTING NEGOTIATIONS MOVING BETWEEN GREECE AND TURKEY.

A. CONGRESSIONAL STRATEGY.

(1) WE CONTINUE TO FEEL THAT US-TURKISH RELATIONS AND PROGRESS ON OTHER FRONTS WOULD BE BEST SERVED BY THE PROMPT PASSAGE, BY BOTH HOUSES, OF THE MANSFIELD-SCOTT BILL. AS NOTED ABOVE, HOWEVER, THE PROSPECTS FOR THIS LEGISLATION APPEAR TO BE SOMEWHAT BLEAK. THE SENATE'S APPROVAL BY ITSELF WOULD HELP POSTPONE TURKISH COUNTER-MEASURES, BUT THIS POSTPONEMENTT WOULD NOT BE INDEFINITE AND THERE SEEMS PRESENTLY TO BE LITTLE GROUND FOR OPTIMISM ABOUT TIMELY AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BY THE HOUSE.

(2) IF THE MANSFIELD-SCOTT BILL FAILS IN THE SENATE, OR IF THE BILL IS PASSED BY THE SENATE BUT WILL BECOME BOGGED DOWN IN THE HOUSE, WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD CHANNEL OUR EFFORT INTO AN ALTERNATIVE COURSE. WHAT WE SUGGEST FOR THE DEPARTMENT'S CONSIDERATION IS A LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL WHICH WOULD AUTHORIZE GRANT MILITARY AID TO GREECE ON A ONE-SHOT BASIS IN THE AMOUNT OF PERHAPS \$100 MILLION OR SOMEWHAT MORE, COMBINED WITH A RESTORATION OF GRANT MILITARY AID TO TURKEY LIMITED TO \$30 MILLION (WHICH IS APPROXIMATELY HALF OF WHAT IT WOULD ORDINARILY HAVE RECEIVED), PLUS THE RESUMPTION OF BOTH CREDIT AND REGULAR MILITARY SALES TO TURKEY. THIS ASSISTANCE, IN THE CASE OF GREECE, WOULD BE CONTINGENT ON ITS ESTABLISHING A SATISFACTORY RELATIONSHIP WITH NATO. (EMBASSY ATHENS CAN, OF COURSE, JUDGE BETTER THAN WE THE FEASIBILITY OF IMPOSING THIS CONDITION.) IN TURKEY'S CASE IT

WOULD BE CONTINGENT ON THE GOT'S REFRAINING FROM TAKING MEASURES AGAINST US FACILITIES AND INSTALLATIONS. EQUALLY IMPORTANT, EACH GOVERNMENT WOULD CONTINUE TO RECEIVE AID AUTHORIZED BY SUCH LEGISLATION ONLY IF THE PRESIDENT WERE ABLE, ON A PERIODIC BASIS, TO CERTIFY THAT IT WAS MAKING A BONA FIDE EFFORT TO NEGOTIATE A SETTLEMENT OF THE CYPRUS AND AEGEAN DISPUTES.

(3) THIS PROPOSAL WOULD BE BITTERLY CRITICIZED HERE BECAUSE
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OF THE VERY OBVIOUS CUT IN TURK GRANT ASSISTANCE AND THE MAJOR DISCREPANCY BETWEEN TURK AND GREEK LEVELS OF GRANT ASSISTANCE. DIFFICULT AS THIS SITUATION WOULD BE HERE, HOWEVER, IT WOULD NOT RPT NOT NOT LEAD TO AS DAMAGING CONSEQUENCES AS WOULD A SUSTAINED PROLONGATIONS (EITHER THROUGH CONGRESSIONAL INACTION OR NEGATIVE ACTION) OF THE CURRENT SITUATION. WE SAY THIS BECAUSE WHAT IS CRITICAL FOR TURKEY (IN REAL RATHER THAN PSYCHOLOGICAL TERMS) IS THE RESTORATION OF CREDIT SALES AND AN END TO THE EMBARGO ON REGULAR SALES. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE SEVERE CUT IN THE GRANT ASSISTANCE FIGURE FOR TURKEY FROM WHAT WOULD ORDINARILY HAVE BEEN PROJECTED (AND ITS NOTABLE CONTRAST WITH THE LEVEL EARMARKED FOR GREECE) WOULD PROVIDE AT LEAST SOMETHING OF A "VICTORY" FOR CONGRESSIONAL OPPONENTS OF ANY MILITARY ASSISTANCE RESTORATION UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES TO TURKEY.

(4) IN MAKING SUCH A PROPOSAL TO THE CONGRESS, WE RECOMMEND THAT IT BE MADE CLEAR THAT PASSING ONLY THE GREEK PORTION OF IT WOULD RESULT IN A PRESIDENTIAL VETO--AND THAT ANY OTHER UNILATERAL LEGISLATION AIMED AT MEETING ONLY GREECE'S NEEDS, WITHOUT REFERENCE TO TURKEY, WOULD SIMILARLY FACE A PRESIDENTIAL VETO.

B. SIMULTANEOUS STRATEGY WITH GOT AND GOG.

(1) WE SHOULD URGE THAT DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN ANKARA AND ATHENS AT AN APPROPRIATELY HIGH LEVEL WITH RESPECT TO BOTH CYPRUS AND THE AEGEAN BE UNDERTAKEN AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

(2) WITH RESPECT TO CYPRUS, WE HAVE UP TO NOW FOCUSED ON GETTING AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE TWO COMMUNITIES ON THE ISLAND. GIVEN THE INCREASINGLY SERIOUS GREEK-TURKISH PROBLEM IN THE AEGEAN, SUCH AN INDIRECT APPROACH, WHICH IS NOT RPT NOT TOO PROMISING AT THE MOMENT ON THE ISLAND, AND WHICH HAS NO DIRECT BEARING ON THE AEGEAN, SHOULD, WE THINK, BE RE-EXAMINED. IN THE PAST WE HAVE HAD GREEK AND TURKISH PROXIES NEGOTIATING ON THE ISLAND WITH THE MAINLAND GOVERNMENTS AT THEIR ELBOW. WE WOULD NOW SUGGEST THIS BE REVERSED AND THAT A MAJOR EFFORT BE MADE TO GET TALKS STARTED DIRECTLY BETWEEN THE MAINLAND CAPITALS, EACH WITH ITS ISLAND CLIENT AT ITS ELBOW. A PERHAP ACCEPTABLE ALTERNATIVE TO THIS WOULD BE TO HAVE THE

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ISLAND TALKS CONTINUE IN SOMETHING LIKE THEIR PRESENT FORMAT
WHILE INITIATING CONCURRENT FACE-TO-FACE DISCUSSIONS
BETWEEN THE MAINLAND PRINCIPALS.

(3) WE WOULD HELP TO SET THE STAGE FOR THESE NEW TALKS
BY SEEKING TO DISCOVER THROUGH ACTIVE EFFORTS IN BOTH CAPITALS
AREAS OF COMMON AGREEMENT OR NEAR AGREEMENT. IN ADDITION
TO THE EMBASSIES' EFFORTS AND MOST IMPORTANTLY YOUR CONTINUING
COMMUNICATIONS TO THE LEADERS OF THE GOT AND GOG, WE
BELIEVE THAT THE USE OF A SPECIAL EMISSARY DESIGNATED BY YOU
AS YOUR PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE COULD BE PARTICULARLY HELPFUL
IN ADVANCING THE PARTIES TOWARDS AGREEMENT. AT A LATER STAGE,
HOWEVER, AND DEPENDENT UPON BOTH PROSPECTS AND NEEDS, IT IS
LIKELY TO BE DESIRABLE FOR YOU PERSONALLY TO REPLACE YOUR
EMISSARY IN FACE-TO-FACE DEALINGS WITH THE PRINCIPAL
PARTIES.

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